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Goddess	Unbound:		Chinese	Popular	Religion	and	the	Varieties	of	Boundary		Robert	P.	Weller	Boston	University			 	Dictionary	definitions	of	the	word	“boundary”	tend	to	stress	its	line-like	qualities.1		Boundaries	divide	one	thing	from	another,	clarifying	and	sharpening	zones	of	difference.		Political	maps	offer	a	quintessential	example	of	how	lines	draw	apparently	unambiguous	examples	of	such	barriers,	mostly	clearly	marking	off	nation-states	from	each	other,	but	also	creating	dendritic	hierarchies	of	political	space	within	the	state	–	nested	townships,	counties,	prefectures,	provinces,	and	so	forth.	This	is	not	the	only	way	to	think	about	political	boundaries,	of	course.		The	early	Chinese	empire	thought	of	itself	instead	as	a	civilized	center	whose	outer	limits	gradually	faded	to	barbarism.		With	the	rise	of	the	nation-state	as	the	primary	unit	of	world	politics	beginning	in	the	seventeenth	century,	however,	the	idea	of	a	clear	boundary	around	political	territories	became	hegemonic.		The	Cold	War	tended	to	make	these	boundaries	even	more	absolute,	especially	through	metaphors	like	an	Iron	(or	Bamboo)	Curtain	through	which	nothing	could	pass,	and	through	material	barriers	like	the	Berlin	Wall.		Other	kinds	of	walls	have	also	appeared	in	other	sorts	of	cold	wars,	from	China’s	Great	Wall	to	the	American	attempt	to	wall	off	the	border	with	Mexico.		As	the	Manchu	conquerors	of	
																																																								1	E.g.,	“a	line	which	marks	the	limits	of	an	area;	a	dividing	line”	(“Boundary,”	Oxford	
Dictionaries	|	English,	accessed	September	28,	2016,	https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/boundary);	or	“something	(such	as	a	river,	a	fence,	or	an	imaginary	line)	that	shows	where	an	area	ends	and	another	area	begins”	(“Boundary,”	accessed	September	28,	2016,	http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/boundary).	
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China	and	traffickers	on	the	US/Mexico	border	will	attest,	however,	the	attempt	to	translate	the	theoretical	truth	of	a	line	on	a	map	to	the	empirical	messiness	of	people	on	the	ground	is	never	completely	successful.	Much	of	our	theory	about	how	ritual	works	has	been	equally	concerned	with	the	creation	of	boundaries.		Recall	Durkheim’s	definition	of	the	sacred	as	that	which	is	“set	apart.”2		For	him,	the	division	between	sacred	and	profane	was	the	most	fundamental	categorization	of	human	life,	the	boundary	par	excellence.		Later	followers	like	Mary	Douglas	have	been	even	clearer	about	the	role	of	ritual	in	dividing	the	world	into	categories	–	not	just	of	deities	and	humans,	but	of	kinds	of	humans,	and	especially	into	those	who	do	or	do	not	have	the	right	to	take	part	in	the	ritual.	Like	drawing	lines	on	maps,	such	ritual	acts	accomplish	real	work	in	the	world,	including	the	creation	of	boundaries.		Yet,	that	is	not	all	they	do:		just	like	walls,	rituals	also	teach	us	ways	of	crossing	boundaries.	By	looking	at	religious	and	political	boundaries	in	tandem,	this	essay	aims	to	move	beyond	such	simple	images	of	how	boundaries	can	work.		I	will	suggest	three	broad	ways	of	conceptualizing	boundaries,	each	of	which	entails	different	kinds	of	relationships	across	the	boundary,	and	thus	different	forms	of	civility	and	sociality:	(1)	Iron	curtains,	meaning	attempts	to	translate	the	clarity	and	solidity	of	lines	on	maps	or	ritual	categories	into	daily	life.		(2)	Cell	walls,	which	separate,	but	which	also	channel	communication	across	the	boundary.		In	the	physical	world,	water	often	works	this	way,	allowing	both	smuggled	goods	and	goddesses	to	seep	through	lines	of	separation.		And	(3)	tennis	nets,	which	also	demarcate	boundaries,	but	which	are	constantly	transcended	with	the	rhythms	of	a	
																																																								2	Emile	Durkheim,	The	Elementary	Forms	of	Religious	Life,	trans.	Karen	E.	Fields	(New	York:	Free	Press,	1995).	
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bouncing	ball.		Durkheim	and	Douglas	aside,	much	ritual	actually	works	like	this	–	not	just	drawing	boundaries,	but	teaching	us	how	to	cross	them.3	The	goddess	Mazu,	who	provides	the	main	focus	for	this	essay,	makes	use	of	all	three	kinds	of	boundaries,	varied	across	space	and	time.	These	different	visions	of	boundary	–	solid	barrier,	permeable	membrane,	transcendable	separator	–	sometimes	contradict	each	other	and	sometimes	work	together.		Their	different	possibilities	have	allowed	Mazu	to	take	on	new	kinds	of	roles,	especially	after	the	end	of	the	Cold	War,	and	to	serve	as	an	important	social	and	political	mediator.		At	a	theoretical	level,	this	essay	thus	hopes	to	show	the	advantages	of	broadening	our	understanding	of	the	nature	of	boundaries	to	clarify	how	people	deal	with	otherness;	at	a	more	empirical	level,	it	shows	how	religion	and	politics	have	interacted	in	the	construction	of	new	forms	of	boundary	maintenance	and	dissolution	with	the	waxing	and	waning	of	the	Cold	War	over	the	past	several	decades.	It	is	worth	recalling	that	the	political	separations	in	the	Chinese	world	began	well	before	the	Cold	War.		This	was	especially	stark	for	relations	between	Taiwan	and	mainland	China.		Taiwan's	massive	settlement	by	people	from	southeast	China	had	begun	in	the	seventeenth	century,	and	the	island	became	progressively	more	closely	integrated	–	politically,	culturally,	and	economically	–	with	the	mainland	over	the	next	three	centuries.	It	finally	became	an	independent	province	in	1884.		This	status	proved	short-lived,	however,	when	China	ceded	Taiwan	to	Japan	in	1895,	beginning	an	occupation	that	continued	for	fifty	years.		Contact	between	Taiwan	and	the	mainland	declined	during	this	
																																																								3	This	draws	heavily	on	the	analysis	in	Adam	B.	Seligman	and	Robert	P.	Weller,	Rethinking	
Pluralism:		Ritual,	Experience,	and	Ambiguity	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2012).	
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period,	and	fell	to	essentially	nothing	by	the	late	1930s,	when	China	and	Japan	were	at	war.		The	Cold	War	intervened	almost	immediately	after	the	end	of	World	War	II	brought	Taiwan	back	to	China.	The	result	after	the	Communist	victory	of	1949	and	the	Nationalist	retreat	to	Taiwan	was	that	the	boundary	between	the	two	became	more	rigid	and	impassible	than	it	had	ever	been	during	the	Japanese	period.	Decades	of	tension	between	the	two	regimes	followed	and	affected	Chinese	populations	everywhere	in	the	world,	especially	in	Taiwan	and	among	the	large	overseas	Chinese	populations	of	Southeast	Asia.	This	hardening	of	national	borders	strongly	affected	religion.		By	the	late	1950s,	the	mainland	was	repressing	public	forms	of	religiosity,	and	the	pressure	against	temple	worship	was	increasingly	intense	until	the	early	1970s.		At	the	same	time,	the	staunch	anti-Communism	of	Taiwan	and	many	Southeast	Asian	nations	with	large	Chinese	populations	(like	Malaysia	and	Indonesia)	made	travel	back	and	forth	extremely	difficult.		That	is,	national	boundaries	functioned	more	than	ever	as	iron	curtains,	as	impervious	brick	walls	rather	than	porous	cell	walls.		This	created	more	room	than	ever	before	for	temples	to	define	their	own	unique	identities.	This	essay	is	in	part	the	story	of	how	the	worship	of	Mazu	changed	during	the	Cold	War,	and	how	it	fed	into	the	loosening	of	boundaries	that	occurred	especially	in	the	decade	from	the	beginning	of	China's	economic	reforms	in	1979	to	end	of	the	Cold	War	in	1989.	Mazu	worship	both	adapted	to	and	helped	to	shape	very	different	views	of	how	boundaries	could	work	during	and	after	the	Cold	War.	
Iron	Curtains:	Competing	Notions	of	Mazu	and	Her	Territory	Deities	in	China	are	typically	based	in	places.		They	channel	and	empower	the	cosmic	energies	that	flow	through	particular	formations	of	land	and	water,	and	they	take	
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responsibility	for	the	people	who	live	in	their	territories.4		Earth	Gods	(Tudi	Gong	or	She	
Gong)	are	the	most	obvious	cases.5		At	one	point	every	village	and	many	urban	neighborhoods	had	a	small	temple	to	this	local	god	of	the	place.		They	are	still	extremely	common	in	Taiwan	and	have	been	rebuilt	in	many	parts	of	the	mainland.		Every	family	living	in	his	small	territory	is	expected	to	worship	him.		Some	villages	have	rotational	systems,	where	responsibility	for	burning	incense	in	his	temple	every	day	moves	from	one	family	to	the	next.		Such	a	system	clearly	defines	the	god’s	territory	by	clarifying	who	has	to	take	a	turn	in	this	system.		If	a	family	moved,	they	would	begin	to	worship	at	their	new	Earth	God	temple.	At	a	larger	scale,	greater	deities	ruled	over	larger	territories.		A	town	or	a	village	might	have	multiple	temples	beyond	its	Earth	Gods,	but	typically	just	one	would	dominate	as	the	territorial	patron.		Such	temples	organize	the	largest	annual	rituals	in	the	locality,	during	which	they	clearly	mark	the	boundaries	of	their	territory.		One	way	this	happens	is	financial.		They	sometimes	raise	money	for	such	rituals	(especially	after	the	land	reforms	of	the	twentieth	century	took	away	rental	income	as	a	primary	source	of	funds)	by	demanding	a	small	payment	from	each	household,	giving	as	a	“receipt”	a	magical	charm	to	be	hung	in	the	doorway	to	provide	mystical	protection.		In	some	cases,	the	territory	is	divided	up	into	
																																																								4	There	are	important	exceptions	to	this,	of	course.		These	include	especially	Buddhist	figures	like	bodhisattvas,	who	do	not	have	personal	territories	but	function	instead	for	everyone	in	every	place.		Crucial	Daoist	deities	like	the	Three	Pure	Ones	also	act	universally,	although	specific	Daoist	liturgical	texts	also	recognize	pantheons	of	locally	based	deities.		For	most	ordinary	Chinese	outside	the	professional	ranks	of	Buddhists	and	Daoists,	however,	the	most	important	deities	are	grounded	in	the	locality.	5	Chinese	terms	are	transcribed	in	pinyin	throughout,	with	the	exception	of	place	names	in	Taiwan	(where	I	follow	standard	romanizations	used	there)	and	author	names	where	the	author	typically	uses	an	alternate	romanization	in	English.	
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smaller	units,	which	would	rotate	responsibility	for	the	ritual.		In	either	case,	the	social	organization	of	ritual	both	reflects	and	solidifies	territorial	boundaries.	The	marking	of	territory	becomes	especially	clear	during	major	rituals	in	which	the	god	leaves	his	or	her	temple	to	make	a	grand	tour	(rao	jing).		In	ways	parallel	to	imperial	magistrates	touring	their	territory,	the	gods	are	carried	from	their	temples	in	sedan	chairs,	accompanied	by	their	civil	and	military	followers	–	usually	local	people	dressed	as	soldiers,	or	more	elaborately	as	the	demonic	spirits	whom	the	gods	control.		The	most	important	such	occasion	is	often	the	deity’s	birthday.		Really	important	temples	can	attract	tens	of	thousands	of	people	to	such	events.		The	grand	tour	creates	an	opportunity	for	people	to	get	close	to	the	god,	although	the	huge	crowds	can	make	it	difficult.		The	beating	of	drums	and	gongs,	and	the	constant	explosion	of	fireworks	add	to	the	drama	and	to	the	general	sense	of	heat	and	noise	(renao,	the	aesthetic	associated	with	successful	temple	ritual).		The	god’s	path	on	such	occasions	is	carefully	negotiated,	and	the	details	are	important	exactly	because	the	tour	defines	the	territory.	Many	social	groups	also	defined	their	boundaries	through	deities.		In	late	imperial	times	nearly	every	social	organization,	from	trade	guilds	to	charitable	trusts,	was	organized	around	an	altar.6		Most	importantly	for	Mazu,	she	typically	served	as	the	primary	deity	for	native	place	associations	(huiguan)	of	Fujian	people	in	cities	all	over	China	and	beyond.		The	boundaries	are	not	geographical	in	the	same	sense	as	for	when	Mazu	serves	as	a	community	goddess,	but	they	are	just	as	solid.		They	define	who	has	access	to	the	resources	of	the	group,	from	graveyards	to	scholarships.	
																																																								6	P.	Steven	Sangren,	“Traditional	Chinese	Corporations:	Beyond	Kinship,”	The	Journal	of	
Asian	Studies	43	(1984):	391–415.	
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I	have	been	emphasizing	the	strong	boundaries	of	deities	and	their	social	and	geographic	territories.		Many	deities,	however,	and	all	deities	as	important	as	Mazu,	spread	beyond	their	places	of	origin.		There	are	probably	thousands	of	Mazu	temples	around	the	world	now.		As	each	one	is	created,	however,	it	has	typically	defined	its	own	new,	bounded	territory.		Mazu’s	cult	began	in	northern	Fujian.		From	there	her	temples	multiplied	through	two	primary	mechanisms.		First,	they	spread	as	people	moved	out	from	the	area	and	brought	her	to	their	new	lives.		Mazu	moved	down	the	Fujian	coast	this	way,	and	from	there	all	around	the	world,	because	coastal	Fujian	was	a	major	source	of	emigration	to	Taiwan,	Southeast	Asia,	and	more	recently	to	Europe	and	North	America.		Similarly,	many	northern	Chinese	cities	(Tianjin,	Nanjing,	Shanghai,	and	many	others)	have	Mazu	temples	because	she	was	the	patron	for	Fujianese	merchants	sojourning	in	Chinese	cities	–	these	are	the	native	place	associations	I	just	mentioned.		Second,	the	cult	spread	more	broadly	among	people	who	made	a	living	on	water.		Her	fame	began	when	her	spirit	was	able	to	rescue	fishermen	in	distress.		She	is	thus	especially	associated	with	sea	travel,	but	her	cult	also	spread	among	people	who	worked	river	trade	routes,	especially	those	involved	in	grain	transport	to	the	capital.		Her	temples	thus	existed	up	and	down	much	of	China’s	coast	and	went	far	inland	along	major	waterways,	especially	along	the	Yangzi	and	its	tributaries,	and	the	Grand	Canal.7	Nevertheless,	each	temple	defined	its	own	bounded	group.		Given	the	enormous	social	and	geographical	variation	among	people	carrying	the	cult	(from	paddy	farmers	in	
																																																								7	Xiaojun	Zhang,	“Tianhou	Bei	Chuan	yü	Caoyun	Maoyi:	Yige	Wenhua	Ziben	de	Shijiao	[The	Northern	Spread	of	Tianhou	and	the	Water	Transport	Trade:	A	View	from	Cultural	Capital]”	(unpublished	paper,	n.d.).		See	also	the	map	redrawn	from	Dacheng	Cheng,	Matsu	Chuan,	1955,	in	Edward	R.	Tufte,	Envisioning	Information	(Cheshire,	CT:	Graphics	Press,	1990),	76.	
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the	south	to	boatmen	in	the	north,	from	manual	laborers	in	Chinatown	kitchens	to	merchant	elites	in	major	cities),	it	is	no	surprise	that	Mazu	took	different	forms.		As	she	became	tied	to	each	specific	group,	she	could	change	her	nature.		This	was	one	of	James	L.	Watson’s	points	in	his	analysis	of	the	cult,	where	he	argued	that	the	imperial	state	expected	certain	kinds	of	orthopraxy	in	relation	to	this	(or	any)	cult,	but	showed	little	concern	for	how	local	people	actually	thought	about	the	deity,	thus	allowing	for	much	local	leeway	in	interpretation.8	She	was	sometimes	a	place	deity,	sometimes	a	goddess	of	seafarers,	sometimes	affiliated	with	a	lineage,	and	so	on.		Some	temples	dedicated	to	her	in	Vietnam,	for	example,	have	lost	their	Chinese	associations	and	become	merged	into	Vietnamese	Buddhism.9	Even	her	name	changed:		many	temples	refer	to	her	as	the	Empress	of	Heaven	(Tianhou),	the	highest	title	that	the	imperial	court	awarded	her,	except	in	Taiwan,	where	that	title	was	almost	always	rejected	in	favor	of	the	unofficial	title	of	Mazu	(“Mother	Ancestor”).		This	probably	reflects	Taiwan’s	very	late	Chinese	settlement,	and	its	grudging	and	rebellious	entry	in	to	the	Qing	state.		That	is,	exactly	because	deities	like	Mazu	define	the	boundaries	of	communities,	they	may	be	understood	differently	by	those	communities.	Japanese	colonial	expansion	further	strengthened	some	of	these	boundaries	by	making	it	more	difficult	to	maintain	ties	to	the	heart	of	the	cult	in	Fujian.		This	was	especially	obvious	for	Taiwan,	which	Japan	occupied	from	1895	to	1945.		Returns	to	the	mainland	temples	were	not	impossible	during	the	first	few	decades,	but	the	scale	of	such																																																									8	James	L.	Watson,	“Standardizing	the	Gods:	The	Promotion	of	T’ien	Hou	(‘Empress	of	Heaven’)	Along	the	South	China	Coast,	960-1960,”	in	Popular	Culture	in	Late	Imperial	China	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1985),	292–324.	9	Ngoc	Tho	Nguyen,	“Mieu	Tho	Thien	Hau	Cua	Nguoi	Viet	Vung	Tay	Nam	Bo	[Vietnamese	Thien	Hao	Temples	in	the	Mekong	River	Delta]”	(paper	presented	at	the	Conference	on	Economic	Networks,	Social	Organizations	and	Popular	Culture	in	Vietnam,	Vietnamese	Academy	of	Social	Sciences,	Hanoi,	2016).	
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pilgrimages	was	small.		Japan’s	further	colonial	expansion	to	Southeast	Asia	during	the	war	made	travel	back	to	the	mainland	almost	impossible	for	the	hundreds	of	Mazu	temples	located	outside	the	national	boundaries	of	China.		That	is,	the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	century	had	already	begun	to	isolate	various	Mazu	temples	from	each	other,	especially	across	national	borders.		The	boundaries	that	separated	temples	from	each	other	strengthened,	and	thus	enhanced	each	temple's	tie	to	its	own	local	territory.	The	victory	of	the	Communist	Party	on	the	mainland	in	1949	meant	that	peace	did	not	bring	much	of	a	change	internationally.		Inside	the	country,	the	increasing	political	sensitivity	of	temple-based	religion	(now	condemned	as	feudal	superstition)	meant	that	domestic	connections	between	temples	also	became	more	difficult	to	maintain.		Eventually,	public	worship	in	temples	would	be	shut	down	completely,	though	it	revived	again	to	an	extent	with	the	political	loosening	of	the	1980s.	The	Cold	War	era	thus	exacerbated	tendencies	that	had	already	begun	earlier	in	the	century.		Even	where	temples	survived	on	the	mainland,	ritual	communication	among	them	was	largely	cut	off,	as	were	all	the	larger	pilgrimage	networks	that	had	connected	overseas	temples	back	to	home	areas	on	the	mainland.	As	one	example	of	the	result,	the	Mazu	temples	in	Taiwan	during	this	period	underwent	at	least	two	significant	changes.		First,	they	completely	reworked	their	pilgrimage	networks.		No	longer	able	to	travel	back	to	the	mother	temple	in	Meizhou,	they	argued	internally	instead	about	which	were	the	oldest	temples	in	Taiwan,	and	which	were	most	closely	tied	to	Meizhou.		The	competing	claims	of	legitimacy	altered	the	pilgrimage	
	 10	
networks,	as	a	temple	would	only	go	on	pilgrimage	to	one	they	regarded	as	superior.10	Second,	as	a	result	of	this	competition	and	of	the	greatly	improved	internal	transportation	and	media	networks	under	the	Japanese	regime,	a	handful	of	the	most	important	Mazu	temples	achieved	fame	across	the	entire	island,	greatly	expanding	the	area	over	which	each	temple	could	claim	influence.11		That	is	why	some	of	their	ritual	occasions,	especially	Mazu’s	birthday,	are	probably	now	the	largest	gatherings	in	the	history	of	Chinese	temple	religion.	The	unit	of	identity	that	Mazu	represented	grew	during	this	process,	until	she	had	become	a	kind	of	symbol	for	the	entire	island	by	the	end	of	the	Cold	War,	and	each	of	the	major	temples	drew	on	an	island-wide	community	of	worshippers.		Not	all	of	this	can	be	attributed	to	the	Cold	War	alone,	but	it	certainly	contributed	in	two	crucial	ways:	by	utterly	cutting	off	ties	to	the	mainland	temples	and	by	encouraging	an	identity	as	Taiwanese	and	not	mainlanders,	for	which	Mazu	became	one	of	the	primary	symbolic	carriers.	The	end	of	the	Cold	War	greatly	changed	these	dynamics	–	not	by	returning	them	to	some	earlier	state,	but	by	creating	new	opportunities	to	which	the	temples	could	now	adapt.		Informal	pilgrimages	back	to	mother	temples	in	Fujian	were	among	the	earliest	tendrils	of	renewed	ties	across	the	Taiwan	Strait.		Similarly,	Southeast	Asian	Chinese	often	also	invested	in	pilgrimages	and	temple	reconstruction	on	the	mainland,	beginning	in	the	1980s.	
																																																								10	See,	for	example,	Hsun	Chang,	Wenhua	Mazu:	Taiwan	Mazu	Xinyang	Yanjiu	Lunwenji	
[Cultural	Mazu:	Collected	Research	Papers	on	Taiwan's	Mazu	Beliefs]	(Nankang,	Taiwan:	Institute	of	Ethnology,	Academia	Sinica,	2003).	11	For	the	case	of	the	expansion	of	the	Pei-kang	Mazu,	see	Elana	Chipman,	“The	De-Territorialization	of	Ritual	Spheres	in	Contemporary	Taiwan,”	Asian	Anthropology	8	(September	15,	2009):	31–64.	
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One	result	in	Taiwan	is	that	Mazu	became	entwined	in	identity	issues,	which	had	been	brewing	beneath	the	surface	for	decades.		With	the	end	of	effective	martial	law,	which	had	lasted	from	1945	to	1987,	it	suddenly	became	possible	to	talk	openly	about	an	identity	that	was	“Taiwanese”	above	all,	and	“Chinese”	only	in	a	secondary	sense,	or	for	some	people,	not	at	all.		The	island’s	population	split	among	those	who	supported	reunification	with	the	mainland	(and	thus	usually	also	a	primary	identity	as	Chinese)	and	those	who	wanted	independence.		We	can	think	of	this	too	as	an	issue	of	boundaries:		should	the	borders	of	identity	surround	the	entire	Chinese	nation-state,	including	Taiwan,	or	only	include	the	island	of	Taiwan	itself?		Mazu	temples	became	enmeshed	in	this	beginning	in	1987	–	almost	the	first	possible	legal	instant	–	when	leaders	of	the	Ta-chia	Mazu	temple	visited	the	mother	temple	on	the	mainland	to	bring	back	an	image.		Doing	so	allowed	them	to	claim	a	direct,	first-generation	link	to	the	original	temple,	and	thus	to	be	the	senior	temple	in	Taiwan.		This	would	soon	disrupt	the	most	famous	pilgrimage	in	Taiwan,	in	which	the	Ta-chia	Mazu	went	to	see	the	Pei-kang	Mazu;	now	that	Ta-chia	claimed	seniority,	they	would	no	longer	make	the	trip.	This	event	was	immediately	read	through	the	lens	of	Taiwan’s	post-Cold	War	politics.		The	Ta-chia	Mazu,	people	said,	wanted	reunification	with	the	mainland,	while	the	Pei-kang	Mazu	stood	for	independence	by	refusing	to	make	the	trip.		This	was	further	aggravated	in	1997,	when	the	Meizhou	Mazu	herself	visited	Taiwan.12		In	one	view,	this	was	an	example	of	the	original	Mazu	making	a	tour	of	her	territory.		She	had	actually	never	visited	Taiwan	directly	in	the	millennium	that	the	cult	has	existed,	but	by	visiting	now	she																																																									12	Vivian-Lee	Nyitray,	“Becoming	the	Empress	of	Heaven:	The	Life	and	Bureaucratic	Career	of	Mazu,”	in	Goddesses	Who	Rule,	ed.	Elisabeth	Benard	and	Beverly	Moon	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2000),	173–175.	
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seemed	to	be	claiming	Taiwan	as	part	of	her	own	turf,	and	by	implication,	that	Taiwan	was	really	part	of	the	People's	Republic.		She	was	met	at	the	airport	with	a	clamorous	combination	of	supporters	and	protestors.		As	we	have	seen	before,	the	key	metaphor	here	is	the	idea	that	a	temple	defines	a	territory,	whose	boundaries	are	marked	by	ritual	tours.	Another	arena	in	which	temples,	especially	Mazu	temples,	have	become	involved	in	boundary	issues	is	through	the	idea	of	intangible	cultural	heritage,	which	has	been	important	since	UNESCO	introduced	the	category	in	2003.		China	has	registered	large	numbers	of	such	sites	and	created	a	hierarchy	of	lesser	designations	of	national,	provincial,	and	local	cultural	heritage	sites.		This	has	been	particularly	important	because	the	designation	created	a	new	channel	through	which	religious	practice	could	be	legitimized.		Even	temple	worship,	which	does	not	count	as	religion	in	China,	can	now	be	justified	as	an	important	aspect	of	cultural	heritage.		Enshrining	temples	or	belief	systems	as	cultural	heritage	is	a	way	of	concretizing	memory,	of	saving	it	from	the	ravages	of	time.13	Such	exercises	are	crucial	for	the	creation	of	identity	over	time,	even	if	they	also	threaten	to	alter	some	of	the	original	context	of	temples	and	festivals.		Shared	memories	create	groups,	and	draw	boundaries	from	those	who	do	not	share	them.	Taiwan	plays	the	same	game,	with	the	Ministry	of	Culture	designating	various	festivals	as	intangible	cultural	heritage.		In	this	case	it	is	not	a	direct	response	to	international	opportunity,	because	Taiwan's	liminal	diplomatic	position	makes	it	impossible	to	earn	UNESCO	recognition.		Nevertheless,	the	indirect	influences	of	such	programs	are	obvious	enough,	as	is	the	feeling	that	they	are	competing	with	the	mainland	
																																																								13	See,	e.g.,	Jan	Assmann,	“Collective	Memory	and	Cultural	Identity,”	trans.	John	Czaplicka,	
New	German	Critique,	April	1,	1995,	125–33.	
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for	claims	on	Chinese	cultural	heritage.		The	famous	Mazu	temples	are	a	clear	example.		Mainland	China	has	earned	a	place	for	"Mazu	beliefs	and	customs"	on	UNESCO's	representative	list	of	the	"Intangible	Cultural	Heritage	of	Humanity,"	and	Taiwan	has	responded	by	placing	Mazu	on	its	own	lists.		Mazu	has	thus	been	promoted	in	some	ways	as	a	symbol	of	a	uniquely	Taiwanese	cultural	identity,	concretized	in	bigger	festivals	than	ever	before,	through	academic	conferences	and	writings	on	the	goddess	as	intangible	cultural	heritage,	and	by	taking	the	goddess	to	New	York	to	promote	Taiwan's	perennial	attempt	to	join	the	United	Nations.		They	have	even	constructed	bigger	statues	than	ever	before	–	including	what	claims	to	be	the	largest	in	the	world,	on	the	island	of	Matsu,	glaring	at	the	mainland	across	the	short	distance	of	water	that	separates	them.	Elana	Chipman	points	out	in	a	study	of	Pei-kang,	which	is	another	Taiwanese	town	known	primarily	for	the	Mazu	temple	that	dominates	its	economy,	government	support	for	local	cultural	history	workshops	has	strengthened	two	aspects	of	the	search	for	identity.		The	first	is	a	unifying	island-wide	identity	separate	from	the	mainland,	and	the	second	is	a	purely	local	identity	that,	for	example,	makes	Pei-kang's	Mazu	worship	different	from	Lukang's	or	Ta-chia's.		As	she	writes:		"To	culture	workers,	their	agenda	is	a	local	authenticity	that	they	can	imagine	as	belonging	to	the	town	itself.		Excluded	from	most	forms	of	power	or	social	capital,	they	craft	narratives	of	the	local	past	which	critique	contemporary	distributions	of	power.		Yet,	since	their	work	is	ultimately	the	product	of	a	state-driven	nation-building	project,	it	is	never	merely	local."14		Collective	memory	in	these	
																																																								14	Elana	Chipman,	“Our	Beigang:	Culture	Work,	Ritual	and	Community	in	a	Taiwanese	Town”	(PhD	dissertation,	Cornell	University,	2007),	21.	
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cases,	whether	or	not	it	takes	the	official	United	Nations	form	of	"cultural	heritage,"	materializes	identities	for	people.	Mazu	in	these	contexts	thus	marks	the	boundaries	of	politically	vital	identities	–	through	the	routes	of	pilgrims,	as	the	goddess	tours	her	territory,	or	when	demarcated	as	some	group’s	intangible	cultural	heritage.		The	specific	forms	of	boundary	marking	can	be	quite	different,	even	for	a	single	deity	like	Mazu,	where	one	temple	may	claim	her	as	the	goddess	of	all	the	Chinese	people,	and	another	as	the	goddess	of	just	the	Taiwanese.		Or	the	same	temple	can	make	conflicting	claims,	as	with	Chipman’s	analysis	of	the	Pei-kang	Mazu.		In	every	case,	though,	the	attempt	to	define	clear-cut	and	impassable	boundaries	accompanies	a	claim	to	a	unique	social	identity.		Such	a	unitary	view	of	identity	is	more	the	stuff	of	politicians	than	of	anthropologists,	but	as	such	it	is	vitally	important.		Nevertheless,	as	the	rest	of	this	essay	will	discuss,	iron	curtains	and	singular	identities	are	not	the	only	possible	view	of	boundaries,	of	identity,	or	of	Mazu.	
Cell	Walls,	Diasporas,	and	the	United	Front	Mazu	Historians	have	long	drawn	a	distinction	between	China	as	a	continental	power	and	as	a	maritime	power.15		As	a	continental	power,	China	was	primarily	a	place	of	counties,	prefectures,	and	provinces,	all	organized	into	a	neat	hierarchy	of	clearly	bounded	units.		Deities	and	their	temples	never	matched	this	system	exactly	(although	altars	of	the	official																																																									15	See,	for	example,	John	King	Fairbank,	“Maritime	and	Continental	in	China’s	History,”	in	
The	Cambridge	History	of	China:	Republican	China	1912-1949,	Part	1,	ed.	John	King	Fairbank	and	Denis	Crispin	Twitchett,	vol.	12	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1978),	1–27;	Gungwu	Wang,	“Maritime	China	in	Transition,”	in	Maritime	China	in	Transition,	1750-1850,	ed.	Gungwu	Wang	and	Chin-Keong	Ng	(Wiesbaden:	Otto	Harrassowitz	Verlag,	2004),	3–16;	Xing	Hang,	Conflict	and	Commerce	in	Maritime	East	Asia:	The	Zheng	Family	and	the	Shaping	
of	the	Modern	World,	c.1620-1720	(Cambridge,	United	Kingdom:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2016).	
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state	cult	did),	but	they	nevertheless	echoed	the	logic	of	the	system	when	they	controlled	discrete	territories,	marked	by	annual	parade	routes	and	systems	of	community	responsibility	for	temple	rituals	and	upkeep.		This	is	very	much	the	world	of	clear	boundaries	and	unambiguous	lines	of	authority	that	I	have	been	discussing	–	an	"earthbound	China"	(to	use	Fei	Xiaotong's	phrase)	imagined	on	a	base	of	peasants	permanently	settled	on	ancestral	land.		Mazu	temples	easily	grew	to	fit	into	this	system.	Maritime	China,	however,	was	much	more	open-ended.		The	ocean	carried	ships,	people,	and	goods	across	boundaries	of	all	sorts.		Fishermen,	smugglers,	pirates,	and	traders	plied	the	same	waters,	with	these	roles	often	shifting	flexibly	as	the	ships	crossed	administrative	and	political	borders.		It	might	be	best,	in	fact,	to	see	this	even	more	broadly,	as	a	feature	of	water	transport	generally,	whether	or	not	international	boundaries	are	crossed	or	whether	oceans	are	involved.		Rivers	too	cut	across	borders,	both	domestic	and	international.		Inland	waterways	often	hosted	people	who	seemed	rootless	and	thus	dangerous	to	the	bureaucrats	trying	to	keep	track	of	their	populations	and	to	the	peasants	with	whom	they	traded.		Such	people	included	fishermen	on	China's	many	lakes	and	rivers,	as	well	as	the	transport	workers	who	plied	China's	extensive	inland	waterways.16	Mazu,	more	than	nearly	any	other	deity,	traveled	along	exactly	these	routes,	carried	by	everyone	from	great	naval	leaders	to	the	lowliest	migrants,	fishermen,	and	smugglers.		The	previous	section	emphasized	how	new	territorial	cults	would	arise	around	Mazu	as	she	moved	to	a	new	place,	sometimes	changing	aspects	of	her	identity	and	even	her	name	in	the	process.		Nevertheless,	the	waterways	that	carried	her	left	their	marks	on	her,	so	that	
																																																								16	Xi	He	and	David	Faure,	eds.,	The	Fisher	Folk	of	Late	Imperial	and	Modern	China:	An	
Historical	Anthropology	of	Boat-and-Shed	Living	(Abingdon,	Oxon:	Routledge,	2015).	
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the	underlying	mobility	of	her	worship	is	never	entirely	lost.		If	the	parades	to	mark	the	extent	of	her	territory	were	the	epitome	of	"continental"	Mazu,	then	pilgrimage	routes	provided	the	counterpart	by	reformulating	a	"maritime"	Mazu,	one	whose	journeys	would	not	be	forgotten.	A	pilgrimage	route	is	not	simply	a	recreation	of	an	old,	remembered	journey;	it	is	a	contemporary	creation	of	a	memory	about	connections	between	places	and	people.		It	always	pushes	across	territorial	boundaries,	and	is	in	that	sense	maritime.		And	for	the	same	reason,	the	boundaries	themselves	are	much	more	porous	than	in	the	territorial/continental	version	of	divinity.		We	can	see	this	in	the	well-documented	jostling	for	position	among	Mazu	temples	in	Taiwan,	with	their	competing	claims	to	authenticity	through	direct	ties	to	the	mother	temple	on	the	mainland,	and	to	early	settlement	history	in	Taiwan.		We	can	also	sense	it	in	the	changes	in	scale.		When	the	Lukang	Mazu	–	one	of	the	half	dozen	most	important	Mazu	temples	in	Taiwan	–	went	"home"	to	Meizhou	on	a	pilgrimage	in	1918,	the	image	was	accompanied	only	by	nine	local	leaders,	who	appear	in	the	old	photographs	with	little	fanfare.		When	I	witnessed	her	return	from	another	pilgrimage	in	2006,	however,	thousands	of	people	took	part,	including	hundreds	who	had	made	the	journey,	and	a	vast	display	of	cultural	performance,	from	old	women	dressed	as	108	arhats	("perfected"	followers	of	the	Buddha)	to	young	children	dressed	as	Ming	soldiers.		Mazu	allowed	the	crossing	of	the	tense	boundary	with	the	mainland	while	shaping	a	certain	kind	of	memory	of	a	tie	across	the	Strait.		In	this	sense,	the	boundary	between	Taiwan	and	the	PRC	was	no	longer	a	brick	wall	or	bamboo	curtain	in	the	style	of	the	Cold	War,	but	instead	a	cell	wall,	which	recognized	the	separation	of	the	different	
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temples	and	their	territories,	but	which	also	allowed	that	boundary	to	be	crossed.17		Note	how	the	rivers	and	seas,	along	which	Mazu	and	her	pilgrims	often	traveled,	resembled	cell	walls	in	the	sense	that	they	allowed	passage	of	only	certain	types	of	objects	(ships,	primarily)	along	limited	routes.	Such	pilgrimages	have	had	powerful	effects	at	the	receiving	end	as	well.		The	temples	of	southeastern	China	have	in	general	developed	far	more	rapidly	and	successfully	since	the	reform	period	began	than	in	any	other	part	of	China.		It	is	no	coincidence	that	this	is	precisely	the	area	from	which	emigrants	historically	came,	and	that	the	easing	of	maritime	flows	after	China's	reform	period	began	included	large	amounts	of	funds	from	diasporic	Chinese,	which	often	went	first	of	all	to	temple	reconstruction.	Why	would	local	cadres	in	the	1980s,	when	popular	religion	was	still	largely	linked	rhetorically	with	"feudal	superstition,"	have	allowed	such	a	thing?		One	reason	is	that	overseas	Chinese	offered	valuable	resources	that	could	greatly	aid	a	cadre's	career.		They	might	not	have	cared	about	pouring	money	into	temple	construction,	but	the	construction	itself	and	the	new	flow	of	pilgrims	generated	jobs	and	income.		More	importantly,	those	overseas	donors	could	also	be	told	that	they	would	need	to	contribute	to	hospital,	school,	or	road	construction	as	a	condition	of	their	religious	activity.		Such	projects	burnished	the	record	of	local	officials.	Officials	could	justify	such	policies	theoretically	through	the	idea	of	a	United	Front.		The	United	Front	has	been	a	crucial	concept	in	Chinese	Communist	thought	about	how	to																																																									17	Taiwan	was	the	largest	non-PRC	source	of	pilgrims	in	2009,	sending	over	105,000	people	in	over	3,400	pilgrimage	groups.		The	rest	of	the	world,	led	significantly	by	Southeast	Asian	nations,	sent	roughly	20,000	more	people	in	over	1,100	groups.		See	Chee-Beng	Tan,	“Tianhou	and	the	Chinese	in	Diaspora,”	in	Routledge	Handbook	of	the	Chinese	Diaspora	(Abingdon,	Oxon:	Routledge,	2013),	426.	
	 18	
deal	with	diversity	and	pluralism.		Especially	during	the	anti-Japanese	war	and	then	during	the	early	years	after	1949,	the	Party	recognized	that	there	were	certain	kinds	of	people	who	would	never	be	proper	Communists,	but	with	whom	the	Party	should	and	could	ally	over	the	long	term.		The	Party	set	up	the	United	Front	Work	Department	to	deal	with	such	people,	who	included	all	overseas	Chinese,	people	living	in	"national"	territory	that	the	PRC	did	not	control	(Hong	Kong,	Macao,	or	Taiwan),	ethnic	minorities,	religious	believers,	and	acceptable	capitalists.		The	fundamental	question	was	how	to	conceptualize	diversity:		should	China	host	a	complete	pluralism,	where	a	place	is	left	for	people	to	be	quite	different	(as	in	an	older	idea	of	empire,	especially	in	the	Qing),	or	should	it	insist	on	a	nation-state	idea	in	which	everyone	must	be	fundamentally	the	same?		By	the	1930s,	the	Nationalists	had	chosen	the	nation-state	idea.		Thus,	for	example,	they	stopped	distinguishing	ethnic	groups,	but	insisted	that	everyone	was	a	part	of	the	broad	"Chinese	nationality"	(中华民族).		
The	Communist	Party	chose	a	different	path,	neither	empire	nor	nation-state,	in	recognizing	that	there	could	be	people	who	were	the	same	in	some	ways	and	different	in	others:		their	own	version	of	a	cell	wall.	The	origins	of	the	United	Front	strategy	predate	the	Cold	War,	going	back	to	early	alliances	between	the	Nationalists	and	the	Communists	that	began	in	the	1920s.		This	strategy	for	dealing	with	diversity	by	building	"cell	walls"	–	boundaries	that	were	clearly	marked	but	could	be	crossed	in	certain	ways	–	first	peaked	in	the	1950s.		After	that,	the	idea	of	a	United	Front	declined	in	importance	as	China's	policies	radicalized,	leaving	no	room	for	any	kind	of	difference	from	"Great	Proletarian	Culture"	until	the	1980s,	after	the	reforms	had	toppled	the	structures	and	ideas	of	the	Cultural	Revolution.		It	is	perhaps	no	
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coincidence	that	this	was	also	the	height	of	the	Cold	War,	when	boundaries	of	all	kinds	hardened,	becoming	more	like	brick	walls	than	cell	walls.	China's	economic	reforms,	usually	said	to	have	started	in	1979,	however,	brought	the	United	Front	strategy	back	to	life.		This,	combined	with	the	great	relaxation	of	Cold	War	tension	soon	afterwards,	flooded	new	life	back	into	the	ties	between	the	mainland	and	people	in	Taiwan,	Hong	Kong,	and	around	the	entire	Chinese	diaspora.		Space	once	again	opened	for	ethnic,	religious,	and	other	forms	of	diversity,	and	the	United	Front	Work	Departments	not	only	revived	but	found	themselves	busier	than	ever.		The	dynamics	of	pilgrimage	and	temple	reconstruction	I	have	been	talking	about	fit	exactly	into	the	space	envisioned	by	the	United	Front,	combining	their	responsibility	for	Chinese	who	hold	non-PRC	passports	with	that	for	religion.		In	many	cases,	they	saw	religion	precisely	as	a	way	of	advancing	the	United	Front	with	people	from	Taiwan	and	from	overseas	communities.	This	helps	explain	something	I	found	surprising	while	living	in	Nanjing	in	2013-14.		There	are	two	functioning	Mazu	temples	in	Nanjing	today,	even	though	it	was	well	outside	her	main	base	area	in	Fujian.		Both,	of	course,	related	to	the	watery	mobility	of	the	goddess:		one	(now	controlled	by	the	Daoist	Association),	had	been	the	local	place	association	for	Qing	merchants	from	her	home	area	in	Fujian	and	the	other	(now	controlled	by	the	Buddhist	Association)	had	been	founded	by	Zheng	He,	a	top	official	and	admiral	during	the	Ming	Dynasty,	to	commemorate	the	goddess's	help	in	his	enormous	voyages	of	ocean	exploration	and	trade.		When	I	first	went	to	the	old	merchant	association	temple,	I	noticed	a	placard	on	the	wall	showing	the	names	of	major	donors	in	the	initial	rebuilding	of	the	temple.		This	is	standard	in	many	temples,	but	this	particular	one	stood	out	because	the	first	name	on	the	list,	having	contributed	16,000	RMB,	was	the	Nanjing	United	Front	Work	
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Department	of	the	Communist	Party	and	the	Religious	and	Ethnic	Affairs	Bureau	of	the	city	government.	Normally	the	Party	would	never	make	contributions	directly	to	a	religious	institution,	but	here	the	United	Front	mission	had	clearly	outweighed	the	proper	attitude	of	atheism.		The	other	Mazu	temple	did	not	show	evidence	of	any	direct	contributions	from	the	Party	or	state,	but	their	stone	inscription	of	donors	did	include,	in	first	place,	Lian	Chan,	who	at	that	time	was	the	Chairman	of	the	Nationalist	Party	in	Taiwan.		He	was	more	willing	than	most	Taiwanese	politicians	to	promote	the	cause	of	reunification	by	visiting	the	mainland,	and	would	always	be	sure	to	visit	Nanjing,	the	nominal	Nationalist	capital.		This	is	exactly	the	sort	of	thing	the	United	Front	was	intended	to	foster.		Both	temples	thus	represent	in	part	a	conscious	strategy	by	the	provincial	and	metropolitan	governments	to	reach	out	to	Taiwan	–	especially	to	Taiwanese	businessmen,	who	are	so	important	in	the	region	–	through	the	rather	unexpected	mechanism	of	popular	religion.	It	is	no	coincidence	that	the	new	openness	to	diversity	occurred	exactly	along	the	maritime	routes	over	which	the	population	had	originally	spread	out,	and	that	Mazu	would	thus	become	an	important	shaper	of	newly	reforged	ties.		Cell	walls	have	clear	boundaries	between	what	lies	inside	and	what	lies	beyond	–	metaphorically,	between	self	and	other.		Yet	without	the	ability	to	allow	certain	kinds	of	molecules	to	pass	the	barrier	of	the	cell	wall,	the	cell	will	die.		These	limited,	filtering	openings	are	very	much	like	the	water	routes	that	allowed	certain	kinds	of	traffic	across	national	and	local	boundaries,	and	over	which	Mazu	traveled.		The	boundary	as	cell	wall	could	thus	once	again	become	important	at	the	end	of	the	Cold	War.	
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Tennis	Net	Boundaries:	A	Tale	of	Two	Birthdays	Beyond	the	metaphors	of	iron	curtains	and	cell	walls,	however,	we	can	also	note	that	the	crossing	of	boundaries	can	become	rhythmically	repeated:		ritualized.		This	regularized	crossing	is	what	I	mean	by	the	boundary	as	"tennis	net."		Tennis	nets	are	real	barriers,	and	they	stop	certain	kinds	of	flows.		Yet	with	the	proper	skill,	the	ball	can	be	made	to	cross	the	boundary	over	and	over	again.		This	constitutes	much	of	the	main	work	of	ritual.	Anthropologists	have	often	seen	ritual	as	a	way	of	creating	boundaries.		This	is	certainly	correct,	and	we	could	see	it	in	action	in	the	earlier	discussion	of	how	Mazu	can	become	a	symbol	of	local	identity	tied	to	a	marked	territory.		Yet	such	an	emphasis	risks	underplaying	the	extent	to	which	all	ritual	also	crosses	boundaries.		It	crosses	boundaries	between	ordinary	life	and	the	marked	time	and	space	of	the	ritual	itself,	between	the	worlds	of	sacred	and	profane,	and	often	even	between	the	kinds	of	territories	and	identities	that	it	defines.		Tennis	net	boundaries	can	help	shape	realms	of	civility	because	they	are	examples	of	how	to	accept	and	cross	boundaries	at	the	same	time	–	the	very	definition	of	living	in	a	plural	social	world.	Such	rituals	occur	all	the	time.		Rites	of	cosmic	renewal	(jiao),	which	temples	typically	perform	at	long	but	regular	intervals,	offer	a	simple	example	of	crossing	the	line	between	the	cosmic	and	the	mundane.		Through	priestly	ritual	actions	involving	the	gods	of	heaven	and	the	forces	of	nature,	temples	wash	off	years	of	weakening	power	and	renew	their	life	force.		The	pilgrimages	I	have	mentioned	accomplish	the	same	thing	by	allowing	new	life	to	be	breathed	into	their	god	images,	or	borrowing	some	of	the	power	of	a	great	temple	by	bringing	some	of	its	incense	ash	back	home.		When	regularly	repeated	(that	is,	
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ritualized),	they	also	constantly	reinforce	those	very	lines	of	diasporic	flow	that	first	created	networks	of	temples.	When	I	was	living	across	from	Lukang's	well-known	Mazu	temple	in	2006,	nearly	every	day	was	marked	by	another	kind	of	boundary-crossing	activity,	as	delegations	from	other	temples	in	Taiwan	would	come	to	pay	their	ritual	respect.		These	visiting	groups	were	not	part	of	Mazu's	diasporic	network.		Instead,	they	represented	other	deities	and	temples	with	separate	territories	of	their	own.		Each	group	usually	included	the	deity,	riding	in	a	sedan	chair	with	several	men	to	carry	it,	religious	performing	groups	including	costumed	dancers	and	spirit	mediums,	and	some	other	visitors	with	less	marked	roles.		Typically,	the	group	would	enter	the	courtyard	in	front	of	the	temple,	and	the	performers	would	cleanse	and	sacralize	the	space	through	their	ritual	dances.		The	spirit	mediums,	possessed	by	the	god	of	their	temple,	would	show	its	power	by	slashing	at	their	bodies	with	swords,	nail	maces,	and	other	weapons	of	a	spirit	medium's	arsenal,	until	the	blood	flowed.		At	that	point	the	people	carrying	the	image	of	the	god	in	its	sedan	chair	would	charge	toward	the	temple	entrance,	and	then	retreat	back.		They	would	do	this	three	times	before	actually	entering	the	temple	to	burn	incense	at	the	altar	–	the	god's	equivalent	of	a	respectful	bow	to	the	host.		Here	we	can	see	how	ritualized	action	crosses	the	very	territorial	boundaries	that	deities	create	when	they	tour	their	realms.		Just	as	humans	rely	on	etiquette	to	deal	with	strangers,	the	gods	themselves	use	similar	means	to	allow	respect	to	occur	across	territories.		Such	a	mechanism	in	part	counterbalanced	the	tensions,	especially	over	economic	resources,	that	often	exist	between	communities.	I	have	been	arguing	that	the	height	of	the	Cold	War	built	up	the	impassable	boundaries	of	iron	curtains,	which	encouraged	a	further	localization	of	Mazu.		In	Taiwan,	
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this	eventually	encouraged	her	to	become	a	symbol	for	Taiwanese	identity.		The	easing	after	the	end	of	the	Cold	War,	however,	allowed	the	recreation	of	more	open	cell	wall	boundaries,	encouraged	by	the	United	Front	policies	in	the	People's	Republic.		This	once	again	enlivened	the	boundary-crossings	of	Mazu's	history.		The	situation	is	more	mixed	for	the	tennis	net	boundaries	of	temple	ritual,	not	so	much	because	of	the	Cold	War	as	because	of	the	Communist	regime's	discomfort	with	ritual	and	its	social	frames.	Let	me	try	to	illustrate	this	by	comparing	a	celebration	of	Mazu's	birthday	in	the	People's	Republic	to	those	more	typical	elsewhere,	to	show	how	the	ability	to	cross	boundaries	can	be	damaged	when	the	ritualized	elements	are	removed.		In	Taiwan,	Hong	Kong,	and	much	of	Southeast	Asia,	Mazu's	birthday	on	the	23rd	day	of	the	third	lunar	month	(usually	sometime	in	late	April	or	early	May)	involves	the	elaborate	production	of	ritual,	led	almost	entirely	by	the	local	community	itself.		The	local	governments	of	course	are	aware	of	the	events,	and	Daoist	priests	are	generally	involved.		The	priests	conduct	rituals	of	renewal,	most	of	which	are	done	out	of	sight	of	all	but	a	few	community	members.		The	priests	usually	determine	the	exact	schedule	of	events,	but	the	broad	outlines	are	known	to	everyone.		The	most	important	events	for	most	members	of	the	community	are	the	opera	performances	in	front	of	the	temple,	the	massive	parading	of	the	goddess	through	the	streets	of	the	community,	and	the	opportunity	to	make	offerings	on	this	most	auspicious	of	days.		The	major	social	issues	–	how	to	provide	housing,	food,	sanitation,	and	security	for	crowds	that	are	often	many	times	higher	than	the	population	of	the	towns	housing	the	temples	–	are	all	handled	directly	by	the	community	rather	than	the	priests	or	the	government.		Nowhere	are	these	larger	than	in	Taiwan,	where	a	small	number	of	Mazu	temples	have	grown	into	a	kind	of	island-wide	national	cult	over	the	last	century.	
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Here	we	can	see	both	the	boundary-creation	side	of	such	temples,	especially	in	Mazu's	tour	of	her	territory,	and	the	boundary	crossing	when	people	join	in	as	parts	of	pilgrimage	groups	or	simply	as	visitors	from	other	places.		In	Taiwan	the	boundary	crossing	aspect	of	the	ritual	has	gone	so	far	that	the	cult	has	in	some	sense	partially	deterritorialized,	encompassing	the	entire	island	in	overlapping	spheres	marked	by	the	various	core	Mazu	temples.18		That	is,	Mazu's	birthday,	as	celebrated	in	Taiwan,	combines	all	three	kinds	of	boundaries	that	I	have	been	discussing:		the	"iron	curtains"	of	territorial	marking,	the	"cell	walls"	of	pilgrimage,	and	the	"tennis	nets"	of	regular	re-crossing	of	boundaries.	In	Mainland	China,	however,	I	saw	something	quite	different	during	the	celebration	of	Mazu's	birthday	in	2014.		As	I	mentioned	above,	two	Mazu	temples	have	reopened	in	Nanjing	in	recent	years.		Even	though	popular	religion	like	this	has	no	legal	place	in	the	People's	Republic,	the	state	and	the	Party	encouraged	them	to	rebuild	for	purposes	of	the	United	Front.		Nanjing	is	the	capital	of	Jiangsu	Province,	which	has	received	huge	investments	from	Taiwan	and	which	hosts	a	very	large	Taiwanese	population.		The	government	is	eager	to	keep	the	investment	flows	coming	and,	if	possible,	to	gain	these	people	as	allies.		That	is	precisely	the	job	of	the	United	Front	Work	Department.		The	PRC	state	and	Party	understand	that	religion,	and	Mazu	worship	in	particular,	is	important	to	these	businessmen,	and	can	thus	serve	as	a	convenient	bridge.		This	is	boundary	as	cell	wall.	 Their	legal	system,	however,	will	not	allow	such	temples	to	revive	as	social	institutions	directly	controlled	by	the	local	community,	as	they	are	in	the	rest	of	the																																																									18	Chipman,	“The	De-Territorialization	of	Ritual	Spheres	in	Contemporary	Taiwan.”	
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Chinese	world	and	as	they	were	in	China	proper	before	the	Revolution.		Instead,	because	this	was	done	under	official	auspices,	one	of	the	temples	was	turned	over	to	the	Daoist	Association	and	the	other	to	the	Buddhist	Association,	both	of	which	are	government-supervised	organizations	to	institutionalize	control	over	religion.		Outside	of	China,	such	a	temple	would	never	be	controlled	directly	by	either	Buddhist	or	Daoist	clergy.	One	result	is	that	neither	set	of	priests	has	much	interest	in	the	birthday	celebration,	which	falls	outside	their	liturgical	worlds.		The	"Daoist"	temple	does	not	do	anything	at	all	on	Mazu's	birthday.		The	"Buddhist"	one	does,	but	the	Buddhist	monks	who	run	it	take	no	part.		When	I	asked	the	monk	in	charge	of	the	temple	how	he	felt	about	the	birthday	ritual,	he	said	that	it	was	fine	for	people	to	do	this	celebration,	but	it	had	nothing	at	all	to	do	with	Buddhism	or	religion	at	all.		It	was	just	popular	custom	(minsu).		He	would	not	try	to	change	it,	he	said,	but	he	also	had	no	interest	in	taking	part	in	any	way.		The	local	community	did	not	organize	the	ceremony	either,	in	contrast	to	the	situation	at	similar	temples	outside	of	China	or	in	rural	areas.		Instead,	the	chief	organizer	was	the	Nanjing	Metropolitan	Tourism	Bureau,	because	it	is	in	charge	of	the	park	in	which	the	temple	sits.		No	priests	of	any	kind	were	involved.	This	temple	had	reopened	about	eight	years	earlier,	and	in	prior	years	it	had	carried	the	image	of	Mazu	in	a	tour	of	the	local	neighborhood,	like	a	scaled-down	version	of	her	territorial	tours	in	other	places.		When	I	watched	in	2014,	however,	the	government	had	decided	to	make	the	ceremony	more	austere	by	limiting	the	procession	to	the	grounds	of	the	park	itself.		This	was	an	odd	arrangement	that	involved	a	one-way	journey	from	the	temple	to	a	pavilion	elsewhere	in	the	park,	very	different	from	the	tour	of	the	temple's	
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territorial	boundaries	that	deities	usually	take.		Performance	inside	the	park	discouraged	almost	everyone	from	watching.	By	the	standards	of	Taiwan,	the	ritual	aspects	of	the	birthday	had	been	stripped	of	all	the	life	and	effervescence	that	any	event	needs	to	be	successful	–	it	had	very	little	of	the	quality	of	"heat	and	noise"	()	that	people	so	value.		It	began	with	formal	speeches	on	a	temporary	stage	set	up	directly	across	from	the	temple.		This	was	the	space	where	an	opera	should	have	been	performed	in	other	contexts.		The	speeches	came	from	members	of	the	city's	Tourism	Bureau	and	the	local	district	government,	who	recited	political	chestnuts	about	cultural	preservation.		The	closest	model	seemed	to	be	official	Party	meetings	to	disseminate	new	policies.		Dragon	dancers	stood	around	looking	bored	through	this.		Facing	them	were	a	group	of	about	a	hundred	people	in	sashes	–	representatives	of	companies	who	had	donated	significant	amounts	of	money	for	the	ceremony.		The	chatted	to	each	other,	looking	equally	bored.		Several	hundred	local	residents	also	watched	from	the	sides.		At	last	the	speeches	ended	and	everyone	turned	to	face	the	temple	to	offer	incense.	With	no	priests	to	orchestrate	the	worship	of	the	deity,	the	state	organizers	fell	back	on	a	Confucian	ceremonial	model	that	was	just	the	opposite	of	the	heat	and	noise	that	most	people	would	consider	necessary	to	a	successful	popular	ritual.		A	convener	speaking	in	a	slow	monotone	instructed	people	to	bow	once,	and	a	second	time,	and	a	third	time.		Then	some	of	the	leaders	were	introduced	to	offer	fruit	and	incense	a	first	time,	and	a	second,	and	a	third.		Finally,	the	people	in	sashes	were	given	the	opportunity	to	come	up	in	orderly	rows	and	offer	their	incense.		The	contrast	to	the	atmosphere	of	Mazu's	birthday	in	Taiwan	could	not	have	been	greater.	
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The	lack	of	ritual	leadership	was	even	more	obvious	when	the	procession	began,	because	it	was	clear	that	no	one	knew	exactly	how	to	do	it.		Various	performing	groups	(the	dragon	dancers,	some	costumed	women)	had	been	hired	to	accompany	the	parade,	but	with	no	one	watching	they	soon	lost	their	enthusiasm	and	just	trudged	up	the	hill	gossiping	to	each	other.		The	low	point	came	when	the	bearers	of	Mazu's	sedan	chair	realized	that	they	had	not	rigged	it	properly	for	carrying,	and	put	her	down	on	the	ground	to	rework	the	straps.		This	was	enormously	disrespectful	to	the	deity,	and	marked	a	crisis	point	for	the	success	of	the	ritual.	The	event	simply	petered	out	when	the	group	reached	the	pavilion	at	the	top	of	the	hill.	Whether	this	counts	as	a	"failed	ritual"	is	in	the	eye	of	the	beholder.		In	some	sense,	it	was	not	a	failure	for	the	government	officials,	who	were	able	to	show	their	preservation	of	popular	custom,	their	ability	to	attract	business	donations,	and	above	all	report	to	the	United	Front	Work	Department	that	they	had	helped	foster	a	link	to	Taiwan.		Perhaps	it	was	also	not	a	failure	for	the	donors,	most	of	whom	represented	businesses	based	in	Fujian,	who	could	help	tighten	their	ties	to	local	government.		That	is,	in	a	partial	sense,	this	temple	had	taken	on	the	role	of	Mazu	temples	in	earlier	native	place	associations	for	Fujian	merchants.19		Most	striking,	however,	was	the	complete	absence	of	anyone	from	Taiwan.		No	one	took	part,	I	was	told,	because	the	ritual	was	so	badly	done.		To	take	part	was	to	risk	bringing	bad	luck,	as	when	Mazu's	sedan	chair	was	placed	on	the	ground	–	just	the	opposite	of	what	ritual	should	achieve.	
																																																								19	The	"Daoist"	Mazu	temple	in	Nanjing	had	historically	been	the	base	for	the	Fujian	association	(huiguan),	but	was	no	longer	serving	that	function	at	all,	and	indeed	seemed	to	have	little	public	support	from	any	group.		
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Everything	about	the	situation	contrived	to	minimize	ritual,	and	especially	to	dilute	completely	the	sense	of	wild	excitement	that	proper	Chinese	temple	rituals	normally	generate.		Instead	of	unruly	crowds	elbowing	each	other	to	get	to	an	incense	pot	so	full	of	their	offerings	that	it	would	burst	into	towers	of	flame,	we	had	a	few	rows	of	wealthy	donors	offering	incense	on	command.		Instead	of	thousands	or	tens	of	thousands	of	people	waiting	for	a	glimpse	of	Mazu	as	she	toured	her	territory,	there	was	a	hike	up	a	hill,	witnessed	by	a	few	dozen	people	at	most.		This	diminution	of	ritual	was	the	product	in	part	of	the	government's	anxiety	about	allowing	an	independent,	popular,	public	expression	of	enthusiasm	(religious	or	otherwise),	and	of	a	long-standing	attempt	to	minimize	and	simplify	all	kinds	of	ritual,	from	funeral	practice	to	etiquette.	The	result	was	an	ultimate	failure	of	the	"united	front"	effort	to	use	the	temple	to	build	a	bridge	toward	Taiwan.		The	tennis	net	boundary	instead	came	to	function	like	another	sort	of	iron	curtain,	reminding	Taiwanese	of	the	vast	gulf	between	the	regimes.		Mazu's	birthday	in	Taiwan	encouraged	all	three	ways	of	thinking	about	boundaries,	but	the	one	in	Nanjing	was	held	back	to	some	extent	by	the	state's	attitudes	toward	religion,	even	as	the	post-Cold	War	climate	allowed	much	more	flexible	kinds	of	boundaries	than	before.		That	is,	to	some	extent	the	Cold	War	legacy	of	Mazu	worship	–	its	fragmentation	into	more	localized	versions	cut	off	from	each	other	by	an	iron	curtain	–	has	continued	to	influence	the	cult	even	long	after	the	post-Cold	War	era	allowed	room	for	newer	and	more	flexible	kinds	of	boundaries.	
Conclusion	I	have	been	trying	to	make	two	intertwined	points	in	this	essay,	one	more	theoretical	and	one	more	historical.		Theoretically,	I	hope	to	counter	the	notion	that	
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boundaries	are	best	conceptualized	as	simple	dividing	lines.		Such	lines	of	unambiguous	separation	are	certainly	important,	but	they	are	only	one	possibility	among	several.		We	see	them	with	Mazu	primarily	in	the	way	she	can	define	clear	territories	around	her	temples.		Unusually	for	a	Chinese	deity	of	this	kind,	her	use	as	a	territory	marker	has	also	scaled	up	in	the	Taiwan	context,	so	that	in	some	ways	she	has	become	a	way	to	define	the	entire	territory	of	Taiwan,	and	thus	to	annotate	the	island's	effective	independence.	I	have	also	discussed	two	other	ways	of	thinking	about	boundaries,	both	of	which	are	relevant	to	the	Mazu	cult.		The	first	is	a	permeable	boundary,	which	can	be	crossed	in	certain	ways.		I	have	used	the	metaphor	of	a	cell	wall,	but	the	most	relevant	medium	for	crossing	the	territorial	boundaries	(whether	religious	or	political)	for	Mazu	has	been	the	water	that	flows	without	respect	for	lines	drawn	by	humans,	and	which	has	carried	her	cult	far	inland	in	China,	especially	along	the	Yangzi	River	and	the	Grand	Canal.		Just	as	importantly,	water	has	also	carried	her	over	sea	lanes,	to	Taiwan,	Southeast	Asia,	and	much	of	the	world.		Mazu	often	established	new	territorial	boundaries	as	she	spread,	but	she	also	fostered	a	social	memory	of	the	diasporic	lines	that	connected	people	across	domestic	and	political	borders.		Rather	than	the	total	difference	suggested	by	a	simple	line	on	a	map,	this	kind	of	permeable	boundary	suggests	the	possibilities	of	cross-cutting	connections.	Finally,	I	have	also	discussed	the	ritualization	of	boundary-crossing,	where	the	transcending	of	borders	becomes	a	necessity.		For	Mazu,	we	see	this	particularly	in	the	way	the	goddess	receives	(and	offers)	visits	to	other	territorial	deities,	even	in	contexts	where	relations	between	such	communities	might	be	tense.		Much	like	etiquette	in	interpersonal	interactions,	such	ritual	creates	a	bridge	between	self	and	other.		This	is	what	China's	
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United	Front	strategy	sets	out	to	accomplish,	yet	as	we	saw	in	the	birthday	celebration	in	Nanjing,	it	is	partially	stymied	by	its	deep	discomfort	with	ritual.	Boundaries	thus	do	not	simply	limit	our	communication.		Instead	they	can	channel	it	in	ways	that	sometimes	permit	a	genuine	diversity	–	one	where	people	can	be	truly	different	from	each	other	(in	nationality,	language,	economic	interests)	but	still	interact	civilly.		Recognizing	the	multiple	forms	of	boundary	helps	us	see	the	full	potential	that	resides	in	something	like	the	worship	of	Mazu.	Historically,	I	have	tried	to	argue	that	the	experience	of	the	Cold	War	encouraged	people	to	think	of	boundaries	in	only	the	simplest	way,	as	unbreachable	barriers	–	iron	curtains.		In	the	context	of	Mazu,	it	broke	the	ties	of	diasporic	historical	memory	created	by	pilgrimages	back	to	mother	temples	on	the	mainland.		And	especially	on	the	mainland,	it	ended	all	the	more	ritualized	aspects	of	the	cult	and	undercut	the	basic	concepts	of	the	United	Front.		In	Taiwan,	it	encouraged	Mazu	to	evolve	as	a	territorial	symbol	for	the	island	a	whole	–	for	a	distinctly	Taiwanese	identity.	The	end	of	the	Cold	War,	however,	combined	with	rapid	economic	change,	created	a	new	space	that	made	other	ways	of	thinking	about	boundaries	relevant	again.		Movement	by	water	(and	air)	again	opened	up,	allowing	people	to	reclaim	the	social	memory	of	historical	lines	of	passage	across	boundaries.		Ritual,	too,	took	on	a	new	life.		Just	as	we	saw	earlier	in	Chinese	history,	all	three	forms	of	boundary	are	again	enacted,	and	can	be	seen	in	the	worship	of	Mazu	(along	with	much	else,	of	course).		As	the	Nanjing	birthday	example	showed,	this	process	still	has	some	significant	political	limitations	in	the	People's	Republic	of	China,	but	even	there	we	can	see	a	transformation	in	the	possibilities	for	dealing	with	a	
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plural	society	and	world,	opened	up	in	part	by	the	multiple	forms	of	boundary	that	Mazu	worship	exemplifies.		 	
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